

















Europeanisation is a fashionable concept tightly intertwined with 
the European Union and its project of 
integration. The EU has promotion of 
democracy and the rule of law in Eu-
rope as primary objectives, and – to this 
end – Brussels has initiated a large-scale 
harmonisation of legislation throughout 
Europe and a wholesale transfer of prin-
ciples of good governance from the EU 
core to prospective new member states. 
All in all, this has been a success story. 
The expanded EU (from 15 member 
states in 1995 to 27 in 2007) has become 
what it was intended to be: a club of Eu-
ropean democracies. 
But the EU has even more ambi-
tious plans. The EU is also a state and 
nation building project cast in a demo-
cratic institutional setting. The EU refers 
to itself as a democracy, and the archi-
tects of the Eurobarometers keep ask-
ing respondents for their assessment 
of how democracy works in the Euro-
pean Union. Even so, the EU clearly is 
not a full-blown democracy. It has been 
marred by legitimacy and accountabi-
lity problems, the so-called democratic 
deficit, for years. But not even the most 
dedicated European federalists would 
launch parliamentarism as the obvious 
solution to the problem. Its application 
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Summary This article sets out to clarify the complex relationship between Europeanisa-
tion and democracy. In the process we will get a better understanding of what the EU is, 
what it is not, and what it might become in the shadow of the ongoing Eurozone crisis. 
Organisationally, the EU is a hybrid between intergovernmentalism and statehood. It has 
an ideological commitment to democracy and European integration. It has done more 
to promote democracy in Europe than anyone else, but it cannot practice all that it tea-
ches. It is not – and cannot develop into – a full-blown democracy on a par with its mem-
ber states as long as European state and nation building remains incomplete.
























would expose the member states to the 
constant risk of being overrun by parlia-
mentary majorities. Democracy on the 
level of the member states is much more 
straightforward, but the EU agenda con-
tributes to its complexity. Somehow the 
EU member states have to come to grips 
with the European state building project 
in the current tug-of-war between the 
European Commission and nationalist 
forces for or against deepening Europe-
an integration. 
This article sets out to clarify the 
complex relationship between Europe-
anisation and democracy. In the process 
we will get a better understanding of 
what the EU is, what it is not, and what it 
might become in the shadow of the on-
going Eurozone crisis. 
The EU as a Moving Target
The EU has appeared in many shapes 
and forms – and under different labels – 
since it was founded in 1957. It is a mov-
ing target of sorts, and it was always ea-
sier to identify its visions than to define 
what it is. It started as a peace project 
in the wake of the Second World War. 
Economic cooperation was to make the 
countries of Western Europe, particular-
ly France and Germany, so intertwined 
that war between them would be un-
thinkable. After more than half a centu-
ry of cooperation in Europe, the peace 
project stands out as quite a success sto-
ry, even though nobody knows what 
would have happened if the EU had not 
materialised. But in the background the 
vision of something even greater – the 
United States of Europe – always loomed 
large (Zielonka, 2007: 7-9). The EU was 
thus a state building project from the 
very beginning. The vision is far from 
fulfilled, but the EU has gradually pro-
gressed towards statehood. Its sphere of 
competence has expanded radically and 
within its sphere of competence supra-
national decision making prevails. Indi-
vidual member countries may, therefore, 
find themselves overruled by a qualified 
majority vote in the Council. But the EU 
is not yet fully in charge of high politics 
– defence, security and foreign affairs 
– generally considered the very core of 
the nation state. High politics remains 
a domain for intergovernmental deci-
sion making with full veto rights for all 
member countries. EU foreign policy 
is therefore frequently reduced to non-
committal declarations patching over 
the differences between the 27 member 
countries. 
The EU thus does not qualify as a 
state, or as an intergovernmental organi-
sation like the United Nations. It is per-
haps best described as a mixture of the 
two forms of organisation (Berglund et 
al., 2009: 11-35). But the overall direc-
tion – from intergovernmentalism to-
wards statehood – is indisputable, and 
here we have the source of the conflict 
within the EU between those who pro-
mote this development and those who 
oppose it. The former are frequent-
ly referred to as federalists, and the lat-
ter as EU-sceptics. Both camps are he-
terogeneous, but defined by their most 
dedicated and articulated members. 
Hard-core federalists see ever deepen-
ing integration (read: state building) not 
only as a distant goal but also as the so-
lution to whatever problems the EU may 
encounter along the way. This is the po-
sition frequently taken by leading poli-
ticians in core member countries such 
as France, Germany and Belgium. The 
hard EU-sceptics are also easy to identify 
(Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2008). Here we 
find those who reject the European inte-


















tive governments to get out of the EU. 
They tend to sympathise with right- or 
leftwing extremist parties campaigning 
on a nationalist, at times xenophobic, 
platform. But among the EU-sceptics we 
also find people who think that the EU is 
a good thing, but disapprove of the pace 
and scope of the process of integration. 
This applies to major political parties 
and the entire political establishment in 
individual member countries. 
The conflict about the future direc-
tion of the EU is partly a product of the 
deepening economic integration, but it 
is also the result of the massive territo-
rial expansion of the European Union 
between 1957 and 2007. The original six 
– France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the 
Netherlands, and Luxembourg – were 
gradually joined by the bulk of the EFTA, 
Great Britain’s alternative to the Europe-
an Union, and a number of new demo-
cracies in Southern and Eastern Europe. 
The exodus out of the EFTA began with 
the EU-accession of Britain, Denmark 
and Ireland in 1973 and was all but over 
in 1995, when neutral Finland, Sweden 
and Austria were accepted as full mem-
bers of the EU. These were countries that 
had been critical of the European inte-
gration project from its very beginning; 
once in the European Union, they turned 
EU-scepticism into a powerful force. 
Portugal, one of the new democracies in 
Southern Europe to join the EU in the 
1980s, is in fact the only former EFTA 
member in the EU not to have a long re-
cord of EU-scepticism (Berglund et al., 
2009: 82-83; 101). The first few years of 
the new millennium (2004-2007) final-
ly brought 10 new democracies in post-
communist Central and Eastern Europe 
into the EU. For most of them EU (and 
NATO) membership was a crucial part 
of a foreign policy paradigm shift from 
the Russian to the Western sphere of in-
terest, and in most cases the European 
integration project did not become an is-
sue of contention until later on. 
This is not to say that the new mem-
ber countries since 1973 with their spe-
cial agendas hold the original six back 
from realising their federal visions. Eu-
ropeanisation and the road map defined 
by Brussels have not always had a fa-
vourable audience among the original 
six. In 2005 France and the Netherlands 
somewhat unexpectedly brought the EU 
into a deep constitutional crisis by re-
jecting the EU Draft Constitution in two 
consecutive referendums in May and 
June respectively – a crisis that was not 
resolved until the Lisbon Treaty was ra-
tified in November 2009. The campaign 
for or against the Draft Constitution was 
marked by concern about the long-term 
impact of the recent eastward enlarge-
ment. The French EU-sceptics warned 
against an influx of cheap labour from 
Eastern Europe, eroding French sala-
ries and adding to the unemployment 
rate. But many voters in France and the 
Netherlands were also frustrated about 
the all-European nationalist rhetoric 
in the draft constitution (Toonen et al., 
2005). Everybody knows that the EU is 
not a nation state. But Brussels, never-
theless, likes to describe the EU as a na-
tion with all which that entails – a flag 
and a national anthem, a common Euro-
pean citizenship, common political in-
stitutions, a common currency, and, if 
it had worked out according to plan, a 
common constitution. This is a perfectly 
normal strategy on the part of the Eu-
ropean Commission. State building and 
nation building are parallel phenomena 
that usually require a great deal of time, 
sometimes hundreds of years. This time 
























rhetoric was apparently premature. The 
problem was eventually solved in a clas-
sical EU manner. The offensive refer-
ences to EU symbols were removed and 
the Draft Constitution was restructured 
into the Lisbon Treaty. But the chan-
ges introduced in the Draft Constitution 
were carried over into the Lisbon Trea-
ty lock, stock and barrel; Valéry Giscard 
d’Éstaing, chairman of the Constitution-
al Convent and architect of the Consti-
tutional Draft, sees the two documents 
as interchangeable in terms of substance. 
Even so, the outcome must have been a 
source of dissatisfaction for Giscard and 
his followers (Giscard d’Éstaing, 2007). 
Their vision had been censored, even 
though the all-European symbols were 
everywhere to be seen. 
The Democratic Deficit
The EU has probably done more for 
the development of democracy in Eu-
rope than any other international actor 
or group of actors, but it has also earned 
itself a reputation for its so-called de-
mocratic deficit. The term implies that 
we have democracy, but it is somehow 
flawed. This is probably an accurate de-
scription, even though there are those 
who question the democratic character 
of the EU altogether. Those who com-
plain the loudest about the democratic 
deficit in the EU tend to be EU-sceptics 
and inclined to reject a bi-cameral par-
liamentary system as the obvious solu-
tion to the problem. They prefer the 
current power sharing arrangement be-
tween the European Parliament and the 
Council, where decision making tends 
to be consensual. The qualified majori-
ty clause is rarely used and presumably 
helps to speed up the search for a com-
promise acceptable to all 27 government 
ministers in the Council.
The EU is not a parliamentary de-
mocracy like so many of its member 
countries, or a semi-presidential de-
mocracy like some of its member coun-
tries, or a presidential democracy like 
the United States. But it would arguably 
qualify as a democracy according to the 
criteria it imposes on prospective mem-
ber states since the EU Summit in Co-
penhagen in 1993. The democratic in-
stitutions are in place – the European 
Parliament, the Council, the Commis-
sion and the Court of Justice. The rule 
of law prevails. The EU is in fact govern-
ance by treaties to the extent that politics 
was long relegated to a secondary posi-
tion. The EU undoubtedly promotes hu-
man rights and respect for national mi-
norities within and beyond the Union. 
But – as may be inferred from Figure 1 
– there is a problem with the way demo-
cracy works in the European Union. 
Figure 1 is part of the standard com-
parative politics toolbox. It represents 
the three objects or levels of support – 
the authorities or the political actors, the 
regime, and the political community – 
identified by David Easton, as he deve-
loped his conceptual framework in the 
mid-1960s. Here the ‘regime’ has been 
broken up into its three constitutive 
components – regime principles, regime 
performance and regime institutions, as 
suggested by Pippa Norris in 1999. Eas-
ton defines politics as the ‘authoritative 
allocation of values for a society’ and so-
cieties tend to be associated with nation 
states (Easton, 1965b: 21). But his model 
is theoretically applicable to any politi-
cal system and highly suitable for com-
parative purposes. It helps us to identify 
similarities and differences between the 
political system of the European Union 
and the political system on the level of 


















One might expect the differences to 
dominate, but this is not the case. The 
similarities are in fact striking. The EU 
may not have a written constitution, but 
it is committed to a number of regime 
principles, including democracy and the 
rule of law (Sattler, 2008: 58-62). The 
EU government institutions reflect the 
somewhat limited scope of the Union, 
but the core democratic institutions are 
in place and the Union features a popu-
larly elected parliament as well as Euro-
pean political parties. Elections to the 
European Parliament are held through-
out the Union every five years, but – in 
all fairness – they boil down to a series 
of national elections. The electoral cam-
paigns have a distinctly national flavour, 
and the parties running are almost al-
ways identical with the political par-
ties competing for mandates in national 
elections. The ties between the candi-
dates and parties running for the Euro-
pean Parliament and the parliamentary 
factions or ‘parties’ within the European 
Parliament are unknown to most voters 
and many of them abstain from voting 
(Hix, 2008: 76-84). Together these par-
liamentary parties form an embryonic 
all-European party system, including so-
cialist, conservative and liberal parties, 
but it has thus far left precious few im-
prints on the party systems of the mem-
ber countries (Hix et al., 2007). This 
takes us back to Figure 1, more specifi-
cally to the sense of political community 
Object Characteristics of support
Political actors Specific support for particular political actors 
or authorities.
Regime principles Support for the regime type as a principle or 
ideal, i.e. as the most appropriate form of go-
vernment.
Regime performance Support for the way the system functions in 
practice.
Regime institutions Attitudes towards the constitutional frame-
work, the police, the state bureaucracy, po-
litical parties and the military. Support for 
institutions rather than persons; support for 
the presidency as such rather than the incum-
bent.
Political community A basic attachment to the nation beyond pre-
sent institutions of government and a general 
willingness to co-operate politically.
Figure 1. Levels and Objects of Political Support
























or – in this particular case – rather the 
lack thereof on the EU-level. European 
society is simply too loosely defined to 
provide a solid platform for an all-Eu-
ropean civil society and an all-Europe-
an public sphere. Such a platform may 
materialise in the long run. In the mean-
time, the debate about Europe rolls on in 
German, French and even British media, 
but it hardly has repercussions beyond 
the elite sphere. In the Nordic countries, 
even the elite strata keep a low profile on 
issues of European integration. If at all 
addressed, they are addressed as foreign 
policy issues. 
The composition of the Council and 
the European Commission makes sense 
in terms of the history of the European 
Union. The Council serves as an Upper 
House or Senate in a bi-cameral parlia-
mentary system, but it is not a popularly 
elected body. It is a forum for all the re-
levant government ministers. In a simi-
lar vein, it may be noted that the Euro-
pean Commission – the government of 
the EU – is made up of one commis-
sioner from each of the now 27 member 
countries. These institutional arrange-
ments are traces of intergovernmental-
ism that make full-blown democracy 
difficult. This can be corrected through 
institutional reform, but the competing 
visions about the nature of the Europe-
an Union are likely to make such a re-
form process difficult. The other flaws 
we have identified are much more chal-
lenging in the sense that they cannot be 
removed from the agenda by a stroke of 
the pen. A party system, a civil society or 
a public sphere evolves organically. This 
is what happened in the nation states of 
Europe in the late 1800s and early 1900s, 
and in the long run it might very well 
happen in the EU as well. The contem-
porary European party system is, for in-
stance, reminiscent of the party systems 
that emerged in Western Europe during 
their first few years of democratisation 
(Duverger, 1967; Epstein, 1967); when 
holding out the prospect of public fund-
ing for all-European parties, the EU is 
obviously trying to promote such a de-
velopment. The EU – and its member 
countries – could also do more to make 
the European elections a genuinely all-
European affair (Hix, 2008). 
The democratic process runs much 
more smoothly within the member 
states. Some of them are engaged in state 
and nation building projects of their 
own, but they all have a much more so-
lid societal foundation than the EU. This 
could provide the EU with a reservoir 
of democratic legitimacy, if the EU and 
the member states were generally seen 
as moving in the same direction. But 
they are not. There is no widespread call 
for deepening integration in contempo-
rary Europe. This is not why the EFTA 
countries started to defect to what was 
then known as the European Economic 
Community; and this is not why the new 
democracies in Central and Eastern Eu-
rope lined up for membership in the EU 
in the early 1990s. Support for the Eu-
ropean integration project is generally 
stronger among those who initiated it in 
the 1950s, but the original six also have 
a fair share of critical voices (Berglund et 
al., 2009). The conflict has been there all 
along. The current debt crisis in Europe 
has only made it more visible.
The Debt Crisis
The financial crisis in the US in 2008 
had far-reaching ramifications, and Eu-
rope has since been at the centre of a se-
ries of sovereign debt and bank crises. 
The economic uncertainty unleashed 


















tial to survive as the common curren-
cy of the European Union. In the latter 
part of 2011, international media fore-
saw the imminent breakdown of the 
Eurozone. The focus was then on the 
escalating debt crisis in Greece – an eco-
nomically marginal country within the 
all-European context. But the European 
Commission has since been reminded 
of the mounting problems in far more 
economically central countries like Italy 
and – more recently – Spain. 
Brussels – unsurprisingly – sees more 
integration as the solution to the prob-
lem. This includes empowering the Eu-
ropean Central Bank (ECB), making it 
into a player more on a par with nation-
al banks in countries like Great Britain 
and the US. Exactly what this implies is 
still being negotiated. The rich countries 
in Northern Europe are understanda-
bly reluctant to assume full responsibi-
lity for debts accumulated by their poor 
partners in Southern and South-Eastern 
Europe, and changing the legal frame-
work is a daunting task anyway in a con-
stitutional setting, where consensus is a 
sine qua non for amendments. Brussels 
has therefore failed to live up to the ex-
pectations of the market time and again, 
but in spite of the harsh message often 
accompanying its interventions, ECB’s 
readiness to prop up economies in cri-
sis and defend the common currency 
has been seemingly boundless. Support 
has been forthcoming in many shapes 
and forms, direct (loans) as well as indi-
rect (friendly interventions on the bond 
market), and the amount of money that 
has thus far been poured into the crisis 
economies is difficult to estimate. The 
economic consequences have been ma-
nifold, including a weaker Euro (as com-
pared to the US dollar) and the conspi-
cuous downgrading of Germany’s credit 
rating by Moody’s in late July 2012. Ger-
many apparently lost its top level cre-
dit rating due to its commitments to-
wards other Eurozone countries, while 
Great Britain – a country with weaker 
economic performance, but full control 
over its own currency – defended its top 
level rating (Spiegel Online, 25.7.2012). 
Germany has therefore called for Brus-
sels to be given oversight authority in 
budgetary and fiscal matters in the 
member countries so as to avoid a re-
peat of the recent economic crises in the 
EU. 
The main scenario – at least in Brus-
sels – is thus more of the same. Deep-
ening economic and political integra-
tion may very well be what the Eurozone 
needs to stabilise the common currency 
and avoid unpleasant surprises, but it is 
not necessarily a hit in the EU at large. 
It will at any rate increase the gap be-
tween insiders and outsiders within the 
European Union, and it may eventually 
prompt Britain, always a reluctant Eu-
ropean, to opt out of the EU altogeth-
er. But much may happen along the way. 
Voters in countries not part of the cri-
sis may get tired of subsidising allegedly 
lazy and unreliable people in debt-rid-
den countries. The German Constitu-
tional Court may render German par-
ticipation in the European integration 
project increasingly difficult or put an 
end to it, and Greece may throw in the 
towel, declare bankruptcy and opt out 
of the currency union (Böll et al., 2012a: 
23-31). The latter might seem to be a mi-
nor problem, but it is not. Greece only 
accounts for a minor share of the Euro-
pean gross domestic product (GDP), but 
its economy is deeply intertwined with 
that of other EU countries; the chain re-
actions in the wake of a Greek Euro exit 
























saw that the bankruptcy of the Lehman 
Brothers investment bank in New York 
in the autumn of 2008 would result in a 
worldwide economic meltdown. Yet, it 
unleashed a chain reaction that brought 
us frightfully close to such a meltdown. 
It is frequently argued that firewalls 
around countries like Greece are im-
perative to prevent contagion. Brussels 
has no doubt tried to build such fire-
walls. But there is a number of coun-
tries in different stages of crisis and 
many firewalls to build; in the final ana-
lysis, it is a moot question whether they 
are strong enough to contain the crisis. 
The doomsday scenario is thus not en-
tirely without substance. The British go-
vernment had such a scenario in mind 
when – in November 2011 – instructing 
Her Majesty’s embassies all over Europe 
to brace themselves for social disor-
der and riots in the wake of the pend-
ing breakdown of the Eurozone (Public 
Intelligence, 28.11.2011), and the Ger-
man magazine Der Spiegel has repeated-
ly warned that unskilful handling of the 
Eurozone crisis might set the clock back 
to the 1930s with mass unemployment, 
hyperinflation, protectionism, right-
wing populism and xenophobia – the 
very kind of setting that brought about 
the Second World War and that the EU 
was designed to prevent from ever ma-
terialising again (Böll et al., 2012a: 22-
27). This is also the ultimate argument 
for EU funding of member countries in 
crisis. 
The doomsday prophets are still nu-
merous, but the prospects look much 
brighter now than they did a year ago. 
The EU – and particularly the Eurozone 
– is moving towards deeper integration; 
Greece and other crisis economies are 
trying to come to grips with their prob-
lems within the Eurozone. It has been a 
very costly rescue operation, and it is not 
over yet. But the European great pow-
ers have invested too much money and 
prestige into the common currency to 
let it slide out of control. The debt crisis 
has no doubt dealt a serious blow to the 
image of the European Union, but the 
EU has not lost its attraction on neigh-
bouring countries. EU membership re-
mains coveted. But there is more to the 
EU than the Eurozone, and it is a moot 
question whether the common EU insti-
tutions will be sufficient to accommo-
date the Eurozone as well as the member 
states that have opted out of it. 
The Challenge of Democracy
It should be clear by now that de-
mocracy constitutes a challenge for the 
EU and its member countries. The EU 
has established itself as a club of demo-
cratic countries and successfully pro-
moted democracy in applicant countries 
with an authoritarian and even totali-
tarian past. This objective was achieved 
by making the adoption of European 
standards of governance into a sine qua 
non for successful completion of the 
drawn-out process of negotiations be-
tween the candidate member countries 
and the European Commission, the so-
called acquis communautaire. This rath-
er hands-on approach towards the ap-
plicant countries is also known as EU 
conditionality. It worked well in a setting 
where the applicant countries had EU 
(and NATO) membership as their pri-
mary foreign policy goal, and – as may 
be gauged from Table 1 – it redrew the 
political map of Europe. 
With Freedom House scores be-
tween 1 and 2, the ten East European 
enlargement countries of 2004-2007 and 
two candidate member countries (Croa-


















cies. Countries with scores in the range 
of 2.5-5 have been classified as hybrid re-
gimes. They belong to the grey zone be-
tween democracy and outright dictator-
ship or autocracy. But there are different 
shades of grey; and countries somehow 
within the EU’s sphere of interest gener-
ally do better than other hybrid regimes. 
The table thus suggests that actual or 
perceived closeness to the EU furthers 
democratisation. 
The countries of the Western Balkans 
such as Serbia, Montenegro and Albania 
are close to the EU in the sense that they 
are officially listed as potential EU mem-
bers. Though interested in membership 
and/or close ties with the EU, Moldova, 
Ukraine and Georgia are not seen as po-
tential members in the foreseeable fu-
ture. Relations with those countries are 
handled within the framework of the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) 
– an EU programme launched in 2004, 
offering everything but membership to 
the EU’s new neighbours in Eastern Eu-
rope. This was the first attempt to de-
fine the borders of the European Union, 
but it was also designed to calm Russia, 
always fearful of incursions into its so-
called Near Abroad of former Soviet re-
publics.
The EU thus deserves credit for hav-
ing made Europe safe for democracy, 
but its own road towards democracy has 
been considerably bumpier. Most politi-
cal scientists would argue that democra-
tisation of the EU is an impossible en-
deavour as long as the EU is not a state 
(Linz and Stepan, 1996). But state build-







Czech Republic (1) Montenegro (2.5) Azerbaijan (5.5)
Estonia (1) Albania (3) Kazakhstan (5.5)
Hungary (1) Macedonia (3) Russia (5.5)
Lithuania (1) Moldova (3) Tajikistan (5.5)
Poland (1) Ukraine (3) Belarus (6.5)
Slovakia (1) Bosnia and Herzegovina (3.5) Turkmenistan (7)
Slovenia (1) Georgia (3.5) Uzbekistan (7)
Bulgaria (2) Kosovo (4.5)
Croatia (2) Armenia (5)
Latvia (2) Kyrgyzstan (5)
Romania (2)
Serbia (2)
Table 1. Democracies, Hybrid Regimes and Autocracies in Eastern Europe, 2011
Note: The classification in Table 1 is based on Freedom House ratings of the countries of the 
world on a seven-point scale running from strongly democratic (1) to strongly autocratic (7), 
but the cut-offs defining the regime types are those of Linde and Ekman (2011), and Berglund 
and Ekman (2013). Country scores are reported within parenthesis. The countries listed in 
























sense of political community, and it sim-
ply is not there – at least not on the grass 
root level. For the vast majority of Eu-
ropean citizens, nationality remains the 
primary source of identification (Berg-
lund et al., 2006). Any other outcome 
would have been astounding, consid-
ering the transformation of the EU in 
terms of scope as well as size. What was 
previously a forum for economic coope-
ration has turned into an aspiring po-
litical union, as the number of member 
countries increased from 6 to 27. This is 
hardly an ideal setting for the formation 
of stable European identities or, for that 
matter, for the development of a lively 
and multifaceted all-European civil so-
ciety. Harsh as it might seem, it may be 
argued that the EU political institutions 
were built exclusively for the Europe-
an political elite – heads of state, prime 
ministers and other ministers. There was 
a parliamentary body at the outset, but it 
was indirectly elected and only had con-
sultative functions. The direct elections 
to the European Parliament represent an 
innovation; as does the gradual empow-
erment of the parliament. These were 
important steps towards integrating the 
grass root level into the decision making 
process, but they did not make the EU a 
full-blown democracy. 
The relations between the EU and 
its member states are marred by at least 
three problems. The EU is frequent-
ly seen as something far removed and 
of little concern – thence the general-
ly low turnout in elections to the Eu-
ropean Parliament. It is also associated 
with red tape and bureaucracy by vir-
tue of its many directives and regula-
tions (Hix, 2008). These are minor prob-
lems compared to fundamental conflicts 
about the direction of the EU. There 
have been quite a few of those over the 
past few years revolving around treaties 
and opt-outs, policy issues and budget-
ary matters, but nothing as potentially 
disruptive as the current British posi-
tion on the EU. An EU-member since 
1973, Britain now wants to renegotiate 
the terms of its EU accession with the 
European Commission. In a speech on 
23 January 2013, Prime Minister David 
Cameron also vowed to submit the rene-
gotiated terms for approval or rejection 
by his voters in a simple in/out referen-
dum on Britain’s relations with Europe 
(Cameron, 2013). If the EU does not 
comply with this request, David Came-
ron will have little choice but to pull Bri-
tain out of the EU if re-elected in 2015. 
If the EU does agree to renegotiate, the 
new deal might be rejected by British 
EU-sceptic voters anyway, and the EU 
Commission would have to brace itself 
for similar requests from other member 
countries keen on improving the terms 
of their EU memberships. Vocal EU-
sceptics within the Conservative Par-
ty and the rightwing UK Independence 
Party have supposedly driven the Con-
servative Prime Minister to this drastic 
move. The economic crisis and the call 
for deepening integration to stabilise the 
Eurozone have added fuel to EU scep-
ticism and nationalism throughout the 
Union; in the long run, this nationalist 
revival in Europe might turn out to be 
more damaging to the EU than stabilis-
ing the common currency. 
By Way of Conclusion
Organisationally, the EU is a hy-
brid between intergovernmentalism and 
statehood. It has an ideological com-
mitment to democracy and European 
integration. It has done more to pro-
mote democracy in Europe than any-


















it teaches. It is not – and cannot develop 
into – a full-blown democracy on a par 
with its member states as long as Euro-
pean state and nation building remains 
incomplete. Deepening or vertical inte-
gration has increased the competence 
of the European Union, but statehood is 
not in any way near. It is not even on the 
agenda of the European Commission. 
There is no road map towards a Europe-
an federation within the European Uni-
on, but the logic of the European inte-
gration project is such that the obvious 
solution to most problems is more rath-
er than less integration. In this sense, the 
EU constitutes a permanent challenge to 
the nation states of Europe, and the na-
tion state is a formidable foe. 
Political integration is a bold project. 
It is not over until the different units 
have somehow merged. State and nation 
building usually takes a very long time, 
and it is usually accompanied by force 
and conquest. In the European Union, 
however, integration is based on con-
sent, and not on coercion. The EU is a 
club of European democracies, but it has 
a record of opening up for new mem-
bers upon demand. It is what José Ma-
nuel Barroso, Chairman of the Europe-
an Commission, facetiously referred to 
as a ‘friendly empire’ (Barroso quoted 
in the Telegraph, 11.7.2007; Barroso on 
youtube, 10.7.2007). The 27 countries 
now in the EU add an almost mind-bog-
gling complexity to the process of Euro-
pean integration. The founding fathers 
of the European Union, somewhat na-
ively, believed that the material benefits 
of economic integration would initiate a 
shift of loyalties from the national to the 
European institutions (Pentland, 1973: 
162-167). This never happened. The EU 
institutions were not visible enough, and 
the governments of the member coun-
tries were always ready to take credit 
for what worked out well and shift the 
blame for failures onto the EU. Inte-
gration and innovation processes have 
much in common – they are non-linear, 
contingent upon critical events and thus 
difficult to foresee (Berglund et al., 2006: 
19-24). The current Eurozone crisis may 
turn out to be such a critical juncture. 
It has put the Eurozone on a fast track 
towards deepening integration. Most of 
the EU countries not in the Eurozone are 
theoretically in a slow lane; they will join 
the Eurozone in the future when they 
fulfil the economic convergence crite-
ria. But the EU also includes Eurozone 
opt-outs like Great Britain in search of 
parking space rather than a slow lane to-
wards deepening integration. It remains 
to be seen whether or not the current EU 
institutions will prove robust enough to 
accommodate the actual and potential 
Eurozone countries as well as the per-
manent opt-outs. 
The increasing malaise in Europe is 
largely a function of the ongoing eco-
nomic crisis. It has brought escalating 
unemployment figures, harsh austerity 
programmes and – in many cases – an 
influx of immigrants and asylum seek-
ers. The voters hold their government 
and the EU responsible for this dismal 
state of affairs – thence their shift to-
wards new, alternative or populist par-
ties often campaigning on a nationalist 
and protectionist platform. Not so long 
ago, when times were good and eco-
nomic prospects brighter, European ci-
tizens tended to be satisfied with their 
respective government as well as the Eu-
ropean Union. So, with economic reco-
very, the current nationalist wave in Eu-
rope may possibly recede. But economic 
recovery will not make nationalism go 
away. The latter will keep haunting the 
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Europeizacija i izazov demokracije
SAŽETAK  Članak objašnjava kompleksan odnos između europeizacije i demokracije. Nudi 
se dublje razumijevanje same Europske Unije te njene transformacije u svjetlu krize Euro-
zone. Organizacijski, EU je hibrid interguvernmentalizma i državnosti. Posjeduje ideološku 
predanost demokraciji i europskoj integraciji. Imala je presudnu ulogu u promicanju de-
mokracije u Europi, iako ne može uvijek ispuniti ideal koji zagovara. Nije – i ne može biti – 
punokrvna demokracija na istoj razini sa svojim članicama dokle god izgradnja europske 
države i nacije ostaje nedovršena. 
KLJUČNE RIJEČI  europeizacija, izgradnja države, demokracija
